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ABSTRACT
A flourishing study on Indonesia’s economic history in the last two decades has still 
been unable to change a general impression of limited role of the indigenous people 
in economic activities during modern times. The transformation of the Indonesian 
economy from a colonial economy to a    national economy through the process of 
Indonesianisasi, went through different historical patterns. The independent Indonesia 
did not translate the idea of political nationalism directly   into economic prosperity 
until the late 1950s. As a result,   there is always only a small portion of independent 
entrepreneurs among the population, namely those who are supposed to run the public 
economy smoothly without political intervention. This paper provides theoretical 
considerations and historical facts on the process of Indonesianisasi. It discusses the 
economic life of people in Yogyakarta, the capital city Republic of Indonesia during 
the war of independence, soon after the recognition of Indonesia’s independence in 
December 1949.
Keywords: Indonesianisasi, Colonial period, Foreign domination, Yogyakarta
INTRODUCTION
A flourishing study on Indonesia’s economic history in the last two decades 
has still been unable to change a general impression of how limited the 
role of the indigenous people in economic activities of the archipelago were 
during modern times (Lindblad 1993; Lindblad 1996; Booth 1998; Dick et 
al. 2002; Van Zanden & Marks 2012). It is often argued that the indigenous 
Indonesians played only a marginal role in the economic activities of colonial 
Indonesia. This should not surprise us in as far as these activities are concerned 
with big enterprises. Despite the re-emergence of indigenous Muslim santri 
00-MI-39,-No 2-2013.indd   361 02/06/2014   15:42:23
362 | Masyarakat Indonesia, Volume 39, No. 2, Desember 2013
entrepreneurs in some areas, such as southern Sulawesi, all over Java, southern 
Sulawesi, and southern Kalimantan by the late nineteenth century, foreign 
immigrants, particularly the Chinese and Western capitalists were the major 
actors in the world of business and commerce until the late colonial era.
The successful batik producer and traders from Solo and Yogyakarta or kretek 
manufacturers from Kudus, Ponorogo, and Tulungagung, for example, were 
soon replaced by the newly arrival Chinese immigrants (Suminarsih 1999; 
Castles 1967; Dobbin 1994). Meanwhile, indigenous traders, including those 
who came from various islands in the archipelago, also remained behind 
foreign competitors, particularly in long-distance commerce. Besides the 
disadvantaged structure of the colonial economy, according to Anne Booth 
there are at least two other reasons that explain those failures, as already 
mentioned by many scholars. Those are ‘excessive individualism led to 
commercial jealously and infighting rather than the kind of networking and 
mutual support’ and failed to participate properly in the bazaar economy which 
demanded literacy, numeracy and commercial skills which few indigenous 
Indonesians possessed’ (Booth 1998). As a result, in terms of historiography, 
the history of the indigenous Indonesians in Indonesia’s economic history is 
deeply marginalized.
Before the Pacific war, Indonesia’s nationalist leaders had argued that the 
long foreign domination had clearly disadvantaged the indigenous Indonesian 
entrepreneurs in most parts of the country. Therefore, it is not surprising when 
the government of the newly independent state introduced a policy, which 
provided special rights to the indigenous Indonesians against the ‘foreign’ 
elements in business and commerce. The Indonesian government provided 
special assistance to indigenous Indonesians to set up small business, and 
import licenses for certain easy to sell goods were given only to indigenous 
Indonesian importers.
Some previous studies have argued that these Indonesianisasi programs clearly 
made no difference because the indigenous Indonesian soon found out that 
these programs had failed to alleviate the economic disadvantages among 
the indigenous Indonesians, and that were also not able to create powerful 
indigenous merchant communities (Mackie 1971). Consequently, the lack 
of rational economic behaviour among the indigenous Indonesians and the 
necessary role of foreign elements in day-to-day economic life under changing 
regimes was discussed once again within   the context of the 1950s.
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Despite some successes in a few cases, some Indonesians criticized the 
discriminative policy as an ineffective way to foster new productive Indonesian 
enterprises. Selo Soemardjan has argued that besides unrealistic competition 
between political parties to control economic sources, Indonesianisasi 
as a prominent political economic consideration since independence, is one 
important factor for the failure to create a major breakthrough in the economic 
life in Yogyakarta in the early 1950s (Soemardjan 1962).
It was not the lack of capital and labour that disrupted the three economic 
projects initiated by the Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in Yogyakarta in the 
early 1950s, but it was rather caused by the Indonesianisasi policies 
of the Indonesian government. This policy prevented all projects from 
using foreign experts to fill its necessary requirements for technical and 
managerial assistance in the early stages. The policy also provided no room 
for the Chinese, including those who already held Indonesian citizenship, to 
be involved in such projects due to discriminative policies of the Indonesian 
government against the Chinese after the war. In fact, some prominent Chinese 
were considered capable to lead the projects to success (Soemardjan 1962).
Alongside the theoretical considerations and historical facts mentioned already, 
this article will also discuss the economic life of people in Yogyakarta, the 
capital city Republic of Indonesia during the war of independence, soon after 
the recognition of Indonesia’s independence in December 1949. In fact in a 
broader perspective, there are still many questions which need to be answered 
next to the usual interpretation concerning Indonesianisasi . 1
With respect to this, a particular problem was the so-called ’commercial 
dissemination’, another interpretation of the historical process of 
Indonesianisasi of the Indonesian economy. This term refers to efforts by 
indigenous Indonesians to empower their limited economic sources in search 
of a temporary as well as a permanent solution to long-standing economic 
stagnation inherited from the colonial past. To some extent this is a subaltern 
interpretation of the concept of a national economy in comparison to a similar 
1 For more discussions on Indonesianisasi and the nature of Indonesian economic policy 
between 1950 and 1957, see the survey by Bruce Glassburner  of several views of other 
scholars on that period (Glassburner 1971), a study by John O. Sutter (Sutter 1959), a series 
of interviews conducted study by Indonesian economic historian Thee Kian Wie ( Thee: 
2003), and the latest study by J. Thomas Lindblad (Lindblad 2008).
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nationalistic slogan introduced by Soejono Hadinoto in the early independence 
period (Hadinoto 1949).
People did not start from their strength, but turned over their scattered property 
and limited new opportunity to become productive economic actors. This 
is more about rational economic responsiveness to market opportunities, 
rather than taking over foreign assets under changing regimes. People did 
receive special treatment from the government, but they did not depend on it 
to maximize quick productive returns.
The data are collected from different sources, particularly those provided by 
earlier studies. These secondary sources are very useful to identify the nature 
of the role of indigenous Indonesians in the Indonesian economy during the 
late colonial and early independence periods. Other important sources were 
collected from various national and local newspapers and oral history sources.
COLONIAL LEGACY AND ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY 
Yogyakarta  is  an  area  in  central  Java  where  Javanese  feudal  society, 
colonial legacy and Indonesian nationalist spirit were melting together into 
one pot to form a unique historical experience. Yogyakarta was a special 
princely territory, where both traditional Javanese leaders, namely Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono and Adipati Pakualam still retained their traditional 
authority during the Dutch colonial period, and during the Japanese occupation 
and when Indonesia had become independent. Although the colonial 
government acquired most of their traditional economic and political authority, 
these two Javanese rulers managed to keep their social and cultural influence 
in society, which is still predominantly characterized by agrarian activities.
It was not until 1918 that the traditional appanage system of land control 
began to change. Besides those two traditional principals, royal families and 
royal bureaucrats, the new land policy began to recognize the individual 
rights of ordinary people to own land. This policy, however, did not change 
structurally the distribution of land in this area, where the vast majority of the 
population still hardly had access to land or only controlled a small piece of 
land. In Bantul and Sleman, where most irrigated land is located, for example, 
a household owns no more than 0.75 hectare. Meanwhile, most people in other 
districts of Kulon Progo, Adikarto and Gunung Kidul own dry, infertile land, 
although every household controlled a larger holding (Soemardjan 1962).
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This is also a place where many private companies, particularly Dutch ones, 
invested their capital in plantations, especially tobacco and sugar, since the 
second decade of the nineteenth century. Since the early twentieth century, 
17 sugar factories and tens of thousands hectare large sugar and tobacco 
plantations brought many local peasants and migrants to be involved as paid 
labour, prevented people from using the land properly in a traditional way, 
and introduced the money economy into the daily life of rural societies. More 
than 80 per cent of irrigated cultivated lands were converted into plantations, 
while more than 15,000 people were involved as permanent or seasonal wage 
labour. This sector contributed nearly eight millions guilders per year in the 
form of wages for local employees, and about two millions guilders were paid 
every year to landowners and the local government as rent (Soemardjan 1962; 
Houben 1994).
The expansion of highly capitalized private companies and commercial 
activities attracted more Europeans, predominantly Dutchmen and Chinese 
living in Yogyakarta, particularly since the early twentieth century. The 
number of Europeans rose rapidly from 2,097 in 1890 to 4,885 in 1920 and 
7,317 in 1930. Besides staying in the area close to the plantations or factories, 
these new arrivals and more prosperous Europeans began to set up new 
exclusive settlements in the city of Yogyakarta, such as in Kotabaru, Jetis, and 
Gondokusuman. More than 450 new houses were built specially for Europeans 
in the city of Yogyakarta between 1920 and 1930 (Hudiyanto 1997). Nearly at 
the same time, the Chinese population in this area also increased significantly. 
If in 1890 there were only less than 3,000 Chinese living in this area, their 
number rose to more than 5,000 in 1900 and 7,000 five years later. In 25 years 
between 1905 and 1930, the number of the Chinese population in Yogyakarta 
increased by more than 5,000. The 1930 census recorded 12,640 Chinese 
living in this residency. Together with European traders, Chinese traders, 
middlemen and manufacturers controlled most commercial and industrial 
activities Yogyakarta (Kwartanada 1997).
At the same time, a group of local entrepreneurs emerged in certain 
communities, particularly in the city of Yogyakarta, such as Kotagede, 
Kauman, Prawirotaman, Tirtodipuran, and Karangkajen. They were involved 
in small and medium-size home industry and trading activity, particularly 
in different kinds of textile products and silver-brass-bronze-gold crafts. 
Most craftsmen employed 10-20 workers, but some big juragan had 50 to
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100 employees (Darban 2000; Purwanto & Amini 2003). Some workers were 
local people, but many came from the surrounding regions, including people 
from outside Yogyakarta. Thus, Yogyakarta had changed from a town of court 
artisans to a centre of indigenous industry and trade. Yogyakarta was now 
tied economically with most centres of economic activities in Java. One of 
the batik manufacturers, somebody called Haji Bilal for example, was able 
to tie his business with the ’Big Five’ of Dutch companies during the Dutch 
colonial era and exported his products overseas. Meanwhile a Javanese trader 
specialized on agricultural products namely Surorejo, was regarded by most 
Chinese traders as a competitive competitor (Kwartanada 1997).
The rise of indigenous commercial activities accelerated the formation of a 
more heterogeneous community in Yogyakarta by the late colonial period. 
Besides the traditional peasants and the royal tied communities, the later 
economic expansion paved the way for the increasing number of labour and 
highly respected indigenous merchant communities in this area. The latest 
mentioned community together with new Western educated elites shared a 
higher status in society, something previously enjoyed only by certain people 
around the court and royal family. These all created new social formations 
and social relations in Yogyakarta society, when Indonesia proclaimed its 
independence in 1945 (Surjomihardjo 2000; Gunawan & Harnoko 1994).
Competition between indigenous Indonesians with foreigners, particularly 
Chinese, was unavoidable. Although there were only 28 Chinese batik 
enterprises compared to 178 indigenous batik manufacturers in Yogyakarta 
in 1930, there was a tight competition between the two, since most Chinese 
manufacturers were big business. From more than 20 indigenous commercial 
associations listed by Didi Kwartanada in his study on the Chinese of 
Yogyakarta, in fact, many indigenous people were also involved in the same 
commercial activities, such as hotels and restaurants, contractors, retailers, 
bakeries, transportation, tailor shops, laundry shops and various urban-based 
industries.
As mentioned above, however, these indigenous entrepreneurs mostly 
depended on Chinese traders for raw materials, such as unbleached cloth 
for batik, wax, thread, and unprocessed silver, bronze or gold. Some people 
even received capital assistance from the Chinese in exchange for special 
arrangements in marketing the products. Thus, it was difficult for most 
indigenous Indonesians to compete on equal terms with foreign commercial 
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interests. This became even harder since the colonial government failed to 
provide reasonable financial, managerial and technical assistance to indigenous 
Indonesians in order to fill the gap between competitors. Some indigenous 
leaders in Yogyakarta were aware of this situation and urged local people 
to form commercial associations, such as Kemadjoean Ekonomi Indonesia 
(KEI), founded in 1941.2 This organization then played a very important role 
during the Japanese occupation, when it obtained special rights to be the only 
distribution agency for indigenous enterprises in July 1942.
The economic depression of the 1930s, the Japanese occupation, and the 
Indonesian revolution, however, caused significant social and economic 
changes in general. Some entrepreneurs, indigenous as well as foreigners, lost 
their business due to economic uncertainty. Most sugar factories and tobacco 
plantations stopped their production, and allowed their former workers to be 
unemployed.
Some of them worked in the traditional agricultural sector, because most of 
the land was land no longer occupied by the plantations. The rural economy 
of Yogyakarta shifted from a high dependence on the capitalist economy, 
and returned to traditional agriculture. A more important change took place 
among the royal circles. Noble families began to lose their prestige among 
society, since many of them fell into poverty. Social mobility was no longer 
determined by its relations with traditional circles. Socially, royal tied elites 
had to accept a new lower status since independence. One thing should be 
noted, however, the decolonization process in fact strengthened the role of 
Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX, since he was a Republiken.3 His own traditional 
2 Indigenous commercial associations including   Persatuan Pengusaha Batik Bumiputera, 
Persatuan Warung Indonesia, Persatuan Perusahaan Perak Kotagede, Persatuan Pedagang 
Batik Indonesia, Persatuan Ahli Dagang Roti Indonesia, Persatuan Jagal Indonesian 
Mataram, Persatuan Penjahit Indonesia, Persatuan Toko Indonesia Mataram, Persatuan 
Pemborong Rumah, Persatuan Saudagar Kayu Mataram, Persatuan Angkutan, Persatuan 
Pemeras Susu Indonesia, Golongan Rumah Makan dan Penginapan Indonesia, Persatuan 
Saudagar Hasil Bumi Indonesia, Persatuan Pertenunan Indonesia Mataram, Persatuan 
Pedagang Pasar, Persatuan Bengkel Sepeda, Persatuan Pedagang Tahu Tempe, Persatuan 
Perusahaan Rokok Indonesia, Persatuan Perusahaan Sikat Gigi Indonesia, Perusahaan 
Perusahaan Penatu Indonesia, Persatuan Perusahaan Teh Indonesia Mataram, Golongan 
Pemasak Kulit Mataram, Persatuan Perusahaan Barang-barang Kulit Mataram, Persatuan 
Saudagar Batik Bumiputera, Persatuan Perusahaan Dendeng Mataram, Koperasi Warung 
Merdeka and many others were members of this organization (Kwartanada 1997).
3 This term is usually used to identify supporters of the newly independent Republic of 
Indonesia. Sometimes people also used term kiblik as the opposite to kaum federal, the 
federalist who were considered as Dutch supporters, although this was not always the case.
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authority to some extent also had created a different atmosphere in the 
economic life of Yogyakarta during and after the revolution.
IN SEARCH OF A BRIGHTER FUTURE
Yogyakarta was the area where the Republiken received tremendous support 
during the process of decolonization, particularly after the capital city of 
Indonesia had been moved from Jakarta to Yogyakarta in early January 1946, 
when Allied and Dutch troops were able to control the city and the Republiken 
no longer felt safe to retain their position in Jakarta. Yogyakarta was identical 
with the Republic of Indonesia and the primary symbol for her existence 
against the returning Dutch. Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX himself was the 
major supporter of the Republiken. His support to the Republic of Indonesia 
was proven further, when he rejected to cooperate with the Dutch troops, who 
had occupied Yogyakarta after their military action on 19 December 1948. 
Besides sacrificing much of his personal properties, there were nearly 3,000 
people under his jurisdiction who lost their lives between 19 December 1949 
and 30 July 1949. A rough calculation also indicated that local people lost 
more than Rp. 252 million of their properties during that period (Kementerian 
Penerangan 1953). That situation had saved the traditional Javanese authority 
in Yogyakarta from the revolutionary actions of Indonesian nationalists to 
diminish the existence of traditional elites, as they did in other areas.
In the absence of a normal economic life, the situation caused some tensions 
within the society, where people were struggling to find their proper portion 
in the Indonesianisasi processes. Some Chinese and Dutch properties were 
taken over by local people during the revolution. Fifteen out of seventeen 
sugar factories in Yogyakarta were totally destroyed during the war, while 
most exclusive houses belonging to Chinese and Dutch families, such as in 
Kotabaru, were taken over by Indonesian elites as well as the ordinary people. 
Many Chinese shops located nearby the kampung of indigenous Indonesian, 
such as in Lempuyangan, Gondokusuman, Pingit, Gondomanan, Ngampilan, 
and Kotagede, were robbed. Two Chinese shops in the nearby town market 
of Kotagede, for example, were plundered, while the owners were in refugee 
camps avoiding the war. They were also not allowed to reopen their shops 
when the war had ended. However, some Chinese families in the southeast 
suburb of Yogyakarta on the border with Bantul were left untouched due 
to a special role of a charismatic and respected Chinese dukun and their 
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special relations with some personalities in a group of the Indonesian military 
(Soemarto, interview, Bantul, August 1998; Soegati, interview, Bantul, October 
2003).
Four years after the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence, the 
macroeconomic condition of Yogyakarta was still unstable. This instability 
was caused by several factors, such as the unfinished impact of the economic 
depression in the 1930s, the Japanese occupation, revolution, and the structural 
colonial heritage. Despite this, there was a high hope at the beginning, although 
the business and commercial activities did not growth smoothly as expected in 
Yogyakarta. KEI, the most successful indigenous commercial association in 
the previous era was no longer able to play such an important role. Although 
it is difficult to identify precisely what happened to this association due 
to the limited information, it could be said that KEI was dying in 1947 due 
to managerial disability and the lack of personal interest of its new directors. 
Many of her properties were found under personal possession when the war 
ended (Kwartanada 1997).
When most Republiken were celebrating the fourth year of Indonesia’s 
independence on 17 August 1949, local newspapers reported that the people of 
Yogyakarta had to make a long queue in front of some toko along Malioboro, 
Tugu, Karang Kajen, and other places around the town to buy cloth, rice, salt 
and sugar under the coupon system (Kedaulatan Rakjat, 23 August 1949). The 
local bureaucracy of Kemantren Pamong Projo, Rukun Kampung, Kapanewon 
and Kalurahan was responsible for the fair distribution of the coupons to 
the local people. The coupon listed the name of goods, the amount allowed 
to purchase, and the name of shop where goods could be obtained. Every 
household was allowed to buy a maximum of five meters of textiles of 21 
different qualities in exchange for one coupon in one of the 50 shops which 
had been recommended by PERDU (Perusahaan Dagang Umum - Public Trade 
Enterprise) at fixed prices. In the case of salt, every household was allowed 
to buy according to the number of people living in that house. The allocation 
of every person was 200 gram per month in exchange for 7 cent. Moreover, 
every household was allowed only to exchange their coupon with a kilogram 
of sugar priced at Rp. 1.60 per month.
The office of manpower and social affairs also provided free sandals, shirts, 
batik, or cloth to unemployed local people recommended by the neighbourhood 
association or kampung association. The office served many people who would 
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get the goods because they distributed only 50 pieces of goods for 150 people 
who participated in the scheme a day. Meanwhile, the government office 
responsible for the distribution of goods arranged basic materials, such as 
unbleached cloth and wax in order to encourage indigenous as well as Chinese 
batik enterprises to restart production, which was mostly stopped during the 
war. The distribution was coordinated through PPBI in Panembahan street and 
PPPDJ in Jagang Kuaman street for indigenous or batik division of CHTH in 
Kadaster Street (Kedaulatan Rakjat 16 July 1949).
Soon after the recognition of independence, some foreigners tried to get their 
properties back by using different ways. The Chinese, for example, succeeded 
in regaining their business complex around the Lempuyangan train station 
and market by paying a sum of compensation money or at the full price, but 
they were not allowed return to Bantul and Kotagede. A Chinese family in 
north Yogyakarta was also able to have their factory back because the local 
people recognized the family role in Indonesia’s nationalist movement before 
and during the war. A workshop used to provide technical assistance to most 
sugar factories in Yogyakarta owned by the Dutch was bought by the local 
government and then modified as an industrial plant to produce various metal 
tools and house wares for the local market and surrounding regions. Ironically, 
however, different groups of the Republiken supporters and the Indonesian 
government competed with each other to control some Chinese and Dutch 
warehouses and factories around Yogyakarta seized during the war.
All efforts to restructure the Indonesian economy, however, were affected when 
the new government of the United States of Indonesia (RIS) under finance 
minister Sjafruddin Prawiranegara introduced a new financial policy, known as
‘gunting Sjafruddin’ in March 1950. The government only recognized half of 
the nominal value all bank notes of 5 rupiah and above as a medium of change, 
and another half could be used only for buying government obligations and 
certificates (Purwanto 1991). The policy created market disorder in Yogyakarta. 
Some indigenous batik manufacturers were struck by the fact that the value of 
their customers newly paid debt the day before was only half of the original 
value, while they had to pay the full price in new money for unbleached cloth, 
wax and other batik materials taken from the Chinese distributors. Some 
agricultural commodity traders from Bantul and Kulon Progo experienced a 
similar situation.
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The condition became harder for them when they found that their money in 
local banks had been devalued directly by half of the original amount since 18 
March 1950. Since Yogyakarta was the capital of the Republic of Indonesia 
and because of their nationalist sentiment, most indigenous traders received 
more ORI or URI (Oe(u)ang Republik Indonesia-Indonesian money) than 
the Dutch ‘red money’ in their commercial transactions. In many places, the 
indigenous traders even refused to accept Dutch money (Kedaulatan Rakjat 
2 July 1949). The new financial policy, however, had forced them into a very 
difficult position, because the ORI would not be used any longer from 1 
May 1950 and valued less than the new money (Warta Indonesia 20 March 
1950). They had to change their money, but at a lower exchange rate. Thus, 
many became bankrupt, while many others had to slow down their economic 
expansion. Apart from some optimism about rice reserved for people living in 
Yogyakarta and for the annual Sekaten festival one year after the recognition 
of Indonesia’s independence; in fact, local newspapers reported a food crisis 
in this special territory. The papers mentioned that most people in Wonosari 
and Adikarto still ate gaplek of dried cassava as their daily diet, while the rice 
price rose considerably because of a harvest failure in many rice producing 
areas (Kedaulatan Rakjat 16 December 1950).
Further efforts were made by the local government or by Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX after the recognition of Indonesia’s independence 
by initiating some economic projects which involved many people in the 
rural areas, in order to alleviate economic inequality in the this region. In 
this respect, the agricultural Vak Organisasi Tani Primair (VOTP) project 
of tobacco cultivation started in 1954 was an example of this attempt. This 
project, however, failed to continue due to mismanagement, corruption 
and political conflict. The first sign of its collapse came just after the first 
tobacco harvest, when the management was not able to distinguish properly 
the quality of tobacco leafs produced by participating local peasants. VOTP 
and its counterpart Jakti also failed to play their role to mediate between 
the peasants and the project. With or without learning from his failure with 
VOTP-Jakti project, Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX also tried to create another 
economic centre to accelerate the economic growth of Yogyakarta through the 
construction of a sugar factory in 1956. But until late 1950s, this factory failed 
to operate due to technical and management problems (Soemardjan 1962).
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A similar pessimism was clearly expressed by the local government in 
a comment on the economic condition of Yogyakarta in 1957. Besides the 
failure of some projects, the local government also criticized the failure to 
renovate the cigar factory of ‘Taru Martani’ and an ice factory which had been 
discussed for a long time in the local parliament (Panitya Peringatan 10 Tahun 
Kotapradja Jogjakarta: 1957). Like the 17 sugar factories, the cigar plant did 
not operate at all because of war damage.
Another government sponsored economic activity in the process of 
Indonesianisasi in Yogyakarta was the establishment of Gabungan Koperasi 
Batik Indonesia (GKBI), a federation of Indonesian batik cooperatives. This 
organization was established by several indigenous batik associations in 
Yogyakarta in 1948 at a government initiative. The federation soon played a 
very important role in the batik economy, particularly after the introduction of 
a special economic policy to encourage indigenous Indonesian businessmen 
through the Benteng program. After given mandatory rights to decide how 
much unbleached cloth could be imported every year in 1952, GKBI received 
its special right as a single institution allowed to import unbleached cloth 
in 1955. Subsequently, the federation built a cambric factory in Medari 
north of Yogyakarta in 1962, when the plant employed nearly 2,000 workers 
(Sulistyorini 1993). Although it was not comparable to the previous successful 
KEI, it is not an exaggeration to say that GKBI was the first successful 
‘indigenous cooperative federation’ until the 1950s.
Besides some activities already mentioned above, the issue of Indonesianisasi 
in Yogyakarta must be found in the internal dynamics of the local communities. 
A productive idea, however, emerged unexpectedly from some local 
communities in the middle of this uncertain economic condition. A village 
in south Yogyakarta, for example, was able to create a cooperative which 
provided credit to the local people. The capital was extracted from the sugar 
allocated to local communities in July 1949. Since the local people did not 
need sugar, the local chief then sold them in order to get cash instead.
One study noted that the total money circulated among more than 2,000 
people living in this neighbourhood recorded a growth from Rp. 3,200 at the 
beginning to Rp. 90,000 in 1958. A similar attempt was also taken by some 
neighbourhood villages and among the local people in coconut producing 
centres of Kulon Progo. Concerning the coconut producer, a further 
development of the cooperative was jeopardized by the presence of military 
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in the business. The local military office issued several regulations in order 
to protect indigenous peasant as members of a cooperative from Chinese 
middlemen. However, this involvement slowed down the already well running 
coconut oil production in this area. Some producers, including indigenous 
coconut oil manufacturers, even had to stop their production because there was 
not enough copra available in the market (Soemardjan 1962).
Moreover in southeast Yogyakarta, a local community also took an important 
economically oriented action led by members of a village legislative board 
elected in 1950. One leading figure on the board, who was also a carpenter 
and contractor, trained local youths and provided them with jobs and even 
capital. It was less than two years, during which the local community had been 
well known as the main furniture producer and many worked as carpenters 
in construction projects in surrounding areas and even in Yogyakarta. They 
also played an important role in renovating Kepatihan, the local government 
administrative centre after the war, and in the renovation of two Catholic 
churches in Yogyakarta. Some people from this hamlet were also involved 
as skilled workers in the reconstruction of a new sugar factory in Padokan, 
which was initiated by Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX in 1956 (Soemarto, 
interview, Bantul, August 1998).
A similar initiative was taken by Persatuan Perusahaan Batik Indonesia 
(PPBI), a new name for the Persatoean Pengoesaha Batik Boemi Poetra 
(PPBBP), an organization of indigenous batik entrepreneurs established in 
1934. This association took some actions in order to encourage indigenous 
batik manufacturers with five or more workers to restart their business 
(Kedaulatan Rakjat, 10 September 1949). This association provided all the 
basic materials and marketing assistance for their members since September 
1949. Although this association was also a member of GKBI and received 
government assistance, it was able to mobilize sustainable fund from her own 
members to help new and unfortunate members.
Another  indigenous  textile  association,  called  Perusahaan  Pertenunan 
dan Pembatikan Daerah Jogjakarta (PPPDJ), also took a similar action 
from November 1949. The association assisted only its members under the 
condition that a person already owning weaving tools of the ‘TIB’ model, 
who really wanted to produce cloths (Kedaulatan Rakjat, 5 November 1949). 
This effort stimulated some traditional weaving producers in Yogyakarta to 
expand their activity, such as the people in Moyudan, northwest of Yogyakarta. 
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People in some villages of this under district had already produced various 
kinds of traditional cloth, such as setagen, selendang, sarong, and towels, 
but production was disrupted during the Japanese occupation and the war 
of independence. The capital and technical assistance from the association 
stimulated some people to use new technology and expanded their production 
in the early 1950s. Consequently, Moyudan emerged as a prominent weaving 
producer in Yogyakarta from the mid-1950s (Santosa 2001).
In Kotagede, where an indigenous entrepreneur community had been 
established a long time ago, some people tried to re-establish the glorious past 
after the war without any assistance from the government (Nakamura 1993). 
Some people from Kotagede earned much from making various red and white 
pins during the early revolution, but they did not really limit themselves to 
one particular product. They diversified their industrial activities in response 
to market demand. Some started producing different silver, bronze and brass 
house wares, but they also produced jewellery, decoration, souvenir, cloth, 
shirt, cigarette and even toothbrushes around (Rojikan, interview, Kotagede, 
November 1999; Basyori, interview, Kotagede, November 1999) Meanwhile, 
some established families, particularly among the goldsmiths, continued to 
produce their traditional products (Ismail, interview, Kotagede, November 
1999).
With regard to the capital requirements, some people in Kotagede started 
their business by investing money they made from black market trading 
activities during the Japanese occupation and early independence period 
(Rojikan, interview, Kotagede, November 1999; Yuwono, interview, Kotagede, 
November 1999). But some of them established their industrial and trading 
activity really from scratch. They began with family labour and material 
borrowed from neighbours or collecting them from garbage. Some sources, 
however, claim that a few prominent new entrepreneurs in Kotagede invested 
money taken from rich people during the war. Those people made a fortune 
by plundering their own neighbours, when most people ran to refugee camps 
to escape from the Dutch troops in late December 1948. This was also the 
case in Bantul, where some people ran their new business after the war from 
money provided by a Chinese who received back the stolen goods from their 
guardian during the revolution. When the war was ended, and life returned 
to normal conditions, those guards asked for their share (Purwanto & Amini 
2003; Purwanto 2005).
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CONCLUSION
In seeking the distinctive features of Indonesianisasi of the economy 
of Yogyakarta in the 1950s, an answer may also have been provided to the 
question, whether this process was marked by strong Indonesian government 
support to the indigenous entrepreneurs through a discriminative policy 
toward the Chinese and by taking over foreign properties or was it more a 
rational response toward market opportunity by people on their own initiative? 
However, it seems not possible to give a definite and clear answer to that 
question with the concept of ’commercial dissemination’ into the paper as the 
descriptive evidence is so fragmentary and unreliable. A further extensive study 
is required in order to fill the gap between conceptual frameworks, history as 
a narrative, and historical facts.
It may be more valuable to conclude that the conventional concept of 
Indonesianisasi should be deconstructed in order to get a new understanding 
of Indonesian economic history in 1950s. As already discussed at length by J. 
Thomas Lindblad in his Bridges to New Business (2008), in terms of space and 
time, the concept of Indonesianisasi is a bridge to connect Indonesia’s colonial 
past and the present or the future Indonesia. According to Lindblad, a delay 
in the economic decolonization after the declaration of independence does not 
mean neo-colonialism, since the economy of the country was still based on 
economic nationalism (Lindblad 2008).
The transformation of the Indonesian economy from a colonial economy to 
a national economy through the process of Indonesianisasi, went through 
different historical patterns. Some indigenous Indonesian entrepreneurs in 
Yogyakarta did enjoy special rights through a discriminatory government 
economic policy and by taking over foreign properties, but it could not be 
denied that the internal dynamic of certain indigenous communities did 
produce a significant economic breakthrough in Yogyakarta. Some people even 
had no contact at all with the government and with foreign economic interests 
in transforming their economic life. Local people served a growing market 
with various seeds and they had unlimited economic opportunity in looking 
for a better future. But then it disappeared suddenly when the government and 
foreign interests once again took control of their business after the war. In this 
context, Indonesianisasi was never considered as a set of concepts where the 
public could share in the economic prosperity of the newly independence state.
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If that is the case, it can be said that the political decolonization in Indonesia 
took place without economic decolonialization. The government of the newly 
independent state together with its bureaucracy soon replaced the position of 
the colonial regime politically, but they inherited the colonial culture as well as 
its structure as their own. The emergence of a new regime does not constitute 
a 100 per cent guarantee that there will be an equitable distribution of new 
economic opportunities. The new elite tended to acquire control over economic 
sources, despite the fact that at the same time there was a great demand from 
the vast majority of ordinary Indonesians to be involved directly in different 
economic activities.
The independent Indonesia did not translate the idea of political nationalism 
directly into economic prosperity until the late 1950s. As a result, 
there is always only a small portion of independent entrepreneurs among 
the population, namely those who are supposed to run the public economy 
smoothly without political intervention. It is not surprising that the action of 
ordinary people to search for economic opportunity after achieving political 
independence was always hampered structurally as what happened to those 
in the colonial period. Despite all difficulties, people never stopped trying for 
better opportunities with or without a state-sponsored economy.
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